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Bertrand and Walras equilibria under moral hazard∗ .




We consider a simple model of competition under moral hazard with constant return
technologies. We consider preferences that are not separable in eﬀort: marginal utility of
income is assumed to increase with leisure, especially for high income levels. We show that,
in this context, Bertrand competition may result in positive equilibrium proﬁt. This result
holds for purely idiosyncratic shocks when only deterministic contracts are considered, and
extends to unrestricted contract spaces in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Finally,
these ﬁndings have important consequences upon the deﬁnition of an equilibrium. We show
that, in this context, a Walrasian general equilibrium a la Prescott-Townsend may fail to
exist: any ’equilibrium’ must involve rationing.
1. Introduction
Consider an economy where a large number of insurers compete by oﬀering insurance contracts
to a continuum of agents owing a risky endowment. These endowments are aﬀected by two
types of shocks. One is idiosyncratic; the other is an aggregate shock aﬀecting the economy as
a whole. The probability of occurrence of the individual shock is aﬀected by some unobservable
prevention eﬀort supplied by the agent, while the aggregate shock is exogenous. Finally, agents
have general VNM preferences exhibiting risk aversion, and the insurance technology is linear
and involves neither frictions nor ﬁxed costs. What will the outcome of competition be in this
economy?
Two alternative representations of competition under asymmetric information have been
adopted in the literature. Following the ’strategic’ approach, insurance companies simultane-
ously oﬀer contracts that are then purchased by the agents, and the competitive outcome is
modelled as a Nash equilibrium of this two-stage game1. From this perspective, our economy
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1The introduction of further stages, as discussed by Hellwig (1983) in an adverse selection setting, would not
aﬀect the results in our moral hazard framework.can be viewed as a moral hazard counterpart of Rothschild and Stiglitz’s model of competition
under adverse selection. Alternatively, one can, following the seminal contribution of Prescott
and Townsend (1984a), analyze the economy from a Walrasian viewpoint. Then an equilibrium
is deﬁned as a set of market-clearing ’prices’, where the corresponding ’commodities’ are con-
tracts in a general sense, i.e. contingent lotteries on consumption and eﬀort. In both cases, it has
been recognized that the outcome of competition depends on the set of available contracts. For
instance, if individual are not able to sign (and enforce) exclusive contracts, then the strategic
equilibrium need not coincide with a Pareto eﬃcient allocation2. Also, it is well known that
eﬃciency may in this context require randomized contracts. If lotteries are not enforceable (i.e.,
only ’deterministic’ contracts can be implemented), then again the competitive outcome may
fail to be (second best) eﬃcient.3
Albeit the results presented below hold both when lottery contracts are enforceable and
when only deterministic contracts can be implemented, our main interest, in the present paper,
is the pure moral hazard (PMH) context, where unobservability of eﬀort is the only restriction
on agents’ trades (i.e., consumptions and trades are observable and contractible, lotteries are
enforceable, etc.). The realism of this framework can be questioned, and raises several diﬃcult
issues (for instance, is it possible to monitor individual consumptions or to enforce lottery
contracts?). Still, we believe that the PMH case is the natural benchmark for a study of this
kind, if only because it allows to disentangle the impact of moral hazard per se from that of
other restrictions on trades. Once the logic of PMH situations has been understood, it becomes
easier to predict the outcomes of alternative models where additional constraints (say, non
enforceability of random contracts) are introduced.
In the PMH case, existing results in the literature, as well as conventional wisdom, suggest
that three main conclusions should hold in our framework: (i) competition drives proﬁts to
zero, (ii) a Walrasian equilibrium exists and is (second best) eﬃcient, and (iii) the strategic
equilibrium coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium4. The main claim of the present paper
is that existing results, which have been developed in particular frameworks, are not robust,
and that conventional wisdom is actually wrong. In fact, none of the three properties just
stated holds in general. We exhibit a robust example in which the equilibrium of the strategic
market game entails positive proﬁts for the insurers, while the Walrasian equilibrium fails to
exist. This conclusion does not rely on speciﬁc assumptions such as arbitrary limitations on
the contract space or exogenous unobservability of particular transactions. Rather, it stems
from the interaction of two features of our model, namely non separable preferences and the
presence of an aggregate shock. These features are, if anything, more general than what can be
2The intuition is that the second-best optimal contract between an agent and an insurer typically entails
partial coverage in order to provide the agents with the right incentives to prevention. However, in the absence of
exclusivity, the agent could then purchase a complementary coverage from some competitor, which would unravel
the initial contract. See Helpman and Laﬀont (1975), Arnott and Stiglitz (1987) or Bisin and Guaitoli (1999) for
precise investigations.
3Actually, Bennardo (2001) shows that in situations where second best eﬃciency requires randomization, the
deterministic equilibrium contract may fail to be eﬃcient even within the set of deterministic contracts.
4The last two conclusions are obviously speciﬁc to the moral hazard case. Under adverse selection, Rothschild
and Stiglitz have showed that a strategic equilibrium may fail to exist and/or to generate eﬃcient outcomes.
This feature is due to the externality between contracts that characterizes adverse selection (whether a contract
makes proﬁt or losses depends on the contracts proposed by the competitors). No externality of this type
occurs in a moral hazard context. The same remark applies to the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium a la
Prescott-Townsend under adverse selection (see Bisin and Gottardi (2002) for a thorough investigation).
2found in most of the literature; it is precisely the generality of our perspective that explains the
discrepancies with previous works.
The intuition of the main result can be summarized as follows. We assume that leisure
and consumption are gross complements, i.e., that the marginal utility (resp. disutility) of
leisure (resp. eﬀort) increases with wealth, and that this eﬀect becomes especially important
as the agent gets wealthier. It should be noted that this assumption, if anything, has better
empirical support than the alternative hypothesis that is adopted by most on the literature
- namely, that preferences are additively separable in leisure and consumption. Under moral
hazard, this form of complementarity gives rise to speciﬁci n c o m ee ﬀects that prevent ”usual”
undercutting strategies from eliminating proﬁts. Speciﬁcally, we show that there exists some
(ﬁnite) consumption bundle that maximizes the agent’s utility on the set of contracts inducing
the higher prevention eﬀort level. From this bundle, it is impossible to increase the agent’s utility
(say, by increasing his consumption when the ’good’ outcome is realized) without violating the
incentive constraint, the idea being that additional expected consumption increases the marginal
cost of eﬀort, and that this eﬀect, for large enough consumption levels, overcompensates the
standard incentive eﬀect. If the technology is such that expected wealth in the economy exceeds
the expected consumption corresponding to the optimal bundle, then the principal makes a
positive proﬁt at equilibrium.
For the sake of readability, we stick throughout the model to the insurance story just de-
scribed. However, the scope of our conclusions is much broader. They can be applied to labor
contracts, executive compensation, sharecropping or credit relationships, just to name a few.
They have several surprising implications. One is that the zero proﬁt assumption, often viewed
as a shortcut for competition, should be handled with care. Competition generally implies that
agents receive the best contract available under several constraints, including a non negative
proﬁt condition. Our result suggests that there is no reason to expect the non negative proﬁt
restriction to always bind. A second consequence is that the Walrasian mechanism, powerful as
it is (at least in the Prescott-Townsend version), may fail to work in a moral hazard context. The
interpretation of our non existence result is that rationing may be needed to achieve eﬃciency.
To the best of our knowledge, this conclusion is new, at least when fully non linear (exclusive)
contracts are assumed to be enforceable. Finally, our conclusions have direct consequences for
the literature on incentives. That increasing an agent’s reward when the outcome is ’good’,
while keeping it unchanged in ’bad’ cases, may in fact reduce the agent’s overall incentives (es-
pecially for high levels of wealth or income) may shed a new light on such issues as managerial
incentives and executive compensation. These applications are considered in a companion paper
(Bennardo and Chiappori 2002).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic model and stress its
main properties. Section 3 is devoted to the study of equilibria a la Bertrand. The general
equilibrium perspective is developed in Section 4. Conclusions are discussed in the last section.
2. The model
2.1. Uncertainty
The economy consists of two class of individuals: a continuum of ex ante identical risk averse
agents and a ’large number’ of risk neutral principals competing by oﬀering contracts to the
3agents. Agents have a risky endowment that is aﬀected by two types of shocks. One is an
exogenous aggregate shock inﬂuencing the economy as a whole; i.e., there exist two diﬀerent, ex
post veriﬁable aggregate (or ’collective’) states of the world, s =1and s =2 , that occur with
respective probabilities λ and (1−λ). In addition, the endowment is subject to an idiosyncratic
(or ’individual’, following the distinction emphasized by Cass and al. 1997) shock. Individual
shocks are identically and independently distributed (iid) throughout the population, and the
shock aﬀecting an agent depends on an eﬀort e supplied by this agent in an accident avoidance
technology. The level of eﬀort is not observable by the insurer; we assume for simplicity that
it can take only two values, el and eh,w i t heh >e l. In each aggregate state s, individual
wealth can take two values ya
s >y b
s; the ’good’ outcome a obtains with probability P (e),w h e r e





2. An important assumption is that each agent has to exert the eﬀort














A natural interpretation of this setting is that agents are households, while principals are
insurance companies mutualizing individual risks. Each household may incur an accidental
damage ξs = ya
s−yb
s to its property (the occurrence of an accident then deﬁnes the ’bad’ outcome,
b). The occurrence probability of a damage can be reduced if the agent provides some labor e
in a prevention or maintenance activity that is not observed by the insurer. Finally, the two
aggregate states can be interpreted as weather conditions: state 1 is ’normal weather’, whereas
state 2 corresponds to a ’hurricane’. The presence of aggregate uncertainty is one important
diﬀerence between our framework and most of the moral hazard literature. Of special interest is
t h ec a s ew h e r eyb
2 is very small; i.e., failing to provide the maintenance eﬀort required is always
bad, but can reveal disastrous in case of a hurricane.
Alternative interpretations can of course be considered (e.g., agents and principals could be
respectively thought of as workers and managers, tenants and landlords, etc.). Following most
of the literature on competition under asymmetric information, we will stick to the insurance
interpretation. Throughout the paper, ¯ Ys = Pya
s +( 1− P)yb
s denotes the expected production
in state s when eﬀort is eh, while ¯ ys = pya
s +( 1− p)yb
s is the expected production in state s
when eﬀort is el. From the previous assumptions, we have that
¯ Ys > ¯ ys , ¯ y1 > ¯ y2 and ¯ Y1 > ¯ Y2
2.2. Preferences
Preferences of both the principals and the agents are state independent. Principals are risk
neutral proﬁt maximizers. For any non negative consumption c and any eﬀort e ∈ {e0,e 1},
agent’s preferences are represented by the VNM utility function u(c,e)=v(c,1 − e),w h e r e
1 − e is the agent’s leisure, and v is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, strictly
increasing , and satisﬁes limc→0 ∂v/∂c =+ ∞.L e tcx
s,w h e r ex = a,b and s =1 ,2,d e n o t et h e
agent’s consumption, contingent on each aggregate state and on the realization of the output.
A key point is that, in contrast with most of the literature on moral hazard, we assume that
u is not separable in eﬀort and consumption. This assumption ﬁts the particular interpretation
we just suggested, where eﬀort is interpreted as working time. Non separability of leisure (with
4respect to consumption) is a standard ﬁnding of the empirical literature on labor supply (see
for instance Browning and Meghir (1997)); it reﬂects the very natural intuition that, in general,
the marginal utility of leisure increases with wealth, if only because number of consumable
goods (travel, services,...) are obvious complements of leisure.5 Surprisingly enough, many
standard results of the moral hazard literature turn out to be very sensitive to the separability
assumption, although most of the time the latter is only made for commodity and cannot be
considered as particularly realistic in any sense, as already recognized in the seminal contribution
of Grossman-Hart (1983).
2.3. Contracts
In our insurance setting with exclusive relationships, a deterministic contract speciﬁes a required
eﬀort level and a transfer dx
s from the insurer to the agent, contingent on each realization of the
output (x) and of the aggregate state (s); typically, one expects that da
1 < 0 (i.e., the agent pays
an insurance premium when no damage has occurred, at least in the good aggregate state). For
each transfer, the agent’s consumption is cx
s = yx
s + dx
s. It is of course equivalent, and often
more convenient, to write the contract in consumption terms (instead of transfers). That is, a






that prescribes the required eﬀort level e and the contingent consumptions.
Such a contract is called deterministic albeit it is contingent on the state of world. ’De-
terministic’, here, means that the contract does not entail additional randomness. It is well
known that eﬃciency may require some explicit randomization, which in full generality can be
of two types: ex ante (whereby the contract prescribes some probability distribution on the
recommended level of eﬀort) and ex post (whereby the agent’s contingent payment, conditional















• α is the ex ante probability of eﬀort eh (then el is chosen with probability 1 − α)
• µa
h,s (resp. µb
h,s) is the ex post probability distribution of consumption in state s,c o n d i -
tional on output ya
s (resp. yb
s) and the contractually required eﬀort eh
5AB e c k e r i a nj u s t i ﬁcation relies upon the existence of a domestic production function that produce some
agent-speciﬁc commodity, using time and the consumption good as complementary inputs. Note that, in this
case, the marginal utility of consumption is likely to increase with leisure - i.e., ∂2u
∂c∂e < 0.F o r i n s t a n c e , i f
well-being is proportional to the consumption of a single household good ξ, produced from some constant return
to scale technology :





where φ is increasing concave, then ∂2u
∂c∂e =
∂2f
∂c∂e is always negative.
5• similarly, µa
l,s (resp. µb
l,s) is the ex post probability distribution of consumption in state s,
conditional on output ya
s (resp. yb
s)a n de ﬀort el.
The above construction is equivalent to the one proposed by Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b).
Technically, they deﬁne random contracts as joint probability distributions on eﬀort, output and
consumption; the equivalence with our deﬁnition comes from the fact that lotteries on lotteries
are lotteries. In the remainder, we stick to our notation, where ex ante and ex post random-
ization are explicitly distinguished, for two reasons. One is clarity; we believe that the basic
intuitions (and, speciﬁcally, the role of randomization) can be better grasped with this less com-
pact but may be more pedagogical presentation. Also, the distinction is particularly useful for
the characterization of equilibrium contracts; indeed, ex ante and ex post randomization play
very diﬀerent roles in the equilibrium outcomes, as it will become clear later on.
The general timing of actions is summarized in Figure 1 below.
Insert Figure 1 here
2.4. Incentive and feasibility constraints
Feasibility Allocations are constrained by a feasibility and an incentive compatibility condi-
tion. The feasibility constraint reﬂects the fact that the insurance company must break even in
each aggregate state. For deterministic contracts, this implies that
P (e)ca
s +( 1− P (e))ca
s ≤ P (e)ya
s +( 1− P (e))ya
s,s =1 ,2 (2.2)
For instance, if the contract induces the choice of the high eﬀort level, the constraint becomes
Pca
s +( 1− P)cb
s ≤ ¯ Ys,s =1 ,2 (2.3)
while with a low level it becomes
pca
s +( 1− p)cb
s ≤ ¯ ys,s =1 ,2 (2.4)










l,s +( 1− p)Eb
l,s
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h,s (c) is the mean consumption corresponding to the distribution µa
h,s.
Incentive compatibility Incentive compatibility imposes that the prescribed eﬀort coincides



















x,s (c) is the expected utility corresponding to eﬀort x and the distrib-
ution of consumption µa























s,e h)+( 1− P)u(cb
s,e h) − pu(ca
s,e l) − (1 − p)u(cb
s,e l) (2.7)
denotes the diﬀerence (in some aggregate state s) between expected utilities under the high and
low eﬀorts respectively. It is natural to assume that the incentive problem is non degenerate, in
the sense that the high eﬀort can be implemented by some contract- i.e., that there exists some
strictly positive consumption level ga such that
F(ga,0) > 0
We now state our main assumption on the agents’ preferences:
Assumption D : Marginal utility of consumption uniformly increases with leisure; i.e.,
there exists some k>0 such that, for all (c,e)
∂2u
∂c∂e












In words, we assume that marginal utility of consumption always increases with leisure, and
that this eﬀect is particularly strong for wealthy agents, whereas it is almost negligible for very
low consumption levels.
The geometry of the incentive frontier It is convenient to ﬁx the consumption plan in




























= H deﬁnes a family
of curves κH indexed by the constant H. Any of these curves splits the plane into two areas.
Within one of them, the incentive-compatible set KH, all contracts induce the high eﬀort level
eh,w h e r e a sel is optimal in the complement ¯ KH.
7As it will become clear later on, the shape of the κH curves just deﬁned plays a key role
in the derivation of our result, because it characterizes of the set of incentive compatible allo-
cations for both deterministic and randomized contracts. In the standard case where utility is
separable in eﬀort and consumption, κH is increasing. We now show that this is no longer the
case under Assumption D: in the (ca,c b) plane, κH reaches a global maximum and decreases af-
terwards. Furthermore, for any given constant H the agent’s expected utility is bounded over the
the incentive-compatible set KH - a fact that will be directly linked to the existence of contracts
generating positive proﬁt. Formally:
Lemma 2.1. Assume Assumption D holds true. Then :
• κH is a continuously diﬀerentiable curve in the (ca,c b) plane
• For (ca,c b) small enough, κH is increasing, with a slope smaller than 1.
• There exist a point
¡
¯ ca (H),¯ cb (H)
¢
on κH in the (ca,c b) plane where cb is locally maxi-
mum, and such that, for any ca > ¯ ca (H), κH is decreasing in the (ca,c b) plane. Moreover,
the values of ca at which the maxima are reached are the same for all curves κH.
• For H0 >H, κH0 is below κH in the (ca,c b) plane; i.e., if (¯ ca,c b) ∈ κH and (¯ ca,c 0b) ∈ κH0
then c0b <c b
Proof: See Appendix
Insert here Figure 2
An illustration of this result is provided in Figure 2 for the simple case of a unique global
maximum: in the (ca,c b) plane, κH ﬁrst increases, reaches a maximum, then declines. The in-
terpretation of the maximum level for cb is straightforward : a contract providing a consumption
larger than this maximum when the low production level is realized cannot induce the maximum
eﬀort level, whatever consumption may be in the other state. In other words, a ’too generous’
allocation of consumption in the bad state cannot be oﬀset by an even more generous provision in
the good state. The intuition is that increasing ca has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it broadens
the diﬀerence between consumption in the good and in the bad states. This has good incentives
properties, since choosing the high eﬀort increases the probability of receiving this diﬀerence.
Note, however, that this eﬀect is related to marginal utility of income, so that its magnitude
decreases with wealth. On the other hand, a higher ca increases total (expected) consumption,
which, from Assumption D, raises marginal disutility of eﬀort. This clearly reduces incentives.
For ca large enough, the latter eﬀect may well dominate; it actually does under Assumption D.
A crucial consequence of Lemma 2 is that the agent’s utility is bounded over the incentive
compatible set KH, and reaches its maximal, as stated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2.2. There exists a ﬁnite bundle c∗ (H)=
¡
ca∗ (H),c b∗ (H)
¢
that maximizes the
agent’s expected utility under high eﬀort on the set KH.
8Proof: See Appendix
As it can be seen on Figure 2, increasing the agent’s utility beyond its level at c∗(H) would
require a larger ca,c b or both, but this cannot be compatible with the incentive constraint. An
important consequence of this result is that the agent’s preferences on the contract space exhibit
a satiation property: no increase in consumption can improve the agent’s welfare.
3. Competitive equilibria: the strategic point of view
We now consider our model from a strategic point of view. Competition is represented as a
two-stage game. At stage one, each principal oﬀers one or several contracts. At stage two,
each agent selects a contract and chooses an eﬀort; then the state of the world is revealed and
consumption takes place. An equilibrium is then deﬁned as a subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game. We will call it a Bertrand-Rothschild-Stiglitz (BRS) equilibrium because a feasible,
incentive-compatible contract is a Nash equilibrium outcome of our game if and only if it sat-
isﬁes Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) condition of robustness to the introduction of additional
proﬁtable contracts.
3.1. Preliminary characterization
A ﬁrst step toward the characterization of BRS equilibria is provided by the following result:
Lemma 3.1. At any BRS equilibrium, agents’ ex ante utility is maximized under incentive
compatibility and non negative proﬁt (feasibility) constraints.
Proof. Assume not. Then there exists some contract that is incentive compatible, makes non
negative proﬁt, and provides the agent with strictly higher expected utility than the equilib-
rium one. Decrease the agent’s consumption in the state (1,b) by some ’small’ amount ²>0.
The contract thus obtained is still incentive compatible and is still preferred by the agent to
the equilibrium one, but makes strictly positive proﬁts - a contradiction with the equilibrium
condition.
It should be noted that this Lemma applies not only to general contract spaces, but also to
particular subclasses of contracts (e.g., deterministic ones); in both cases, the BRS equilibrium
generates the maximum level of utility attainable over the set of contracts at stake. A ﬁrst and
simple consequence is the following:
Corollary 3.2. A BRS equilibrium always exists. Moreover, every competitive equilibrium is
constrained Pareto optimal.
The proof of this result is immediate since the agent’s program coincide with the deﬁnition
of the (constrained) eﬃcient outcome preferred by the agents; again, the Corollary holds for any
contract space. Note, however, that the constrained Pareto eﬃciency of BRS equilibria is not a
9very robust result. For instance, it is well known that it does not hold under adverse selection.6
Even in the moral hazard context, the conclusion strongly depends on the assumption that only
one good is consumed in the economy, as proved in Bennardo (1997).
We shall now derive our ﬁrst result, namely that the BRS equilibrium may entail positive
proﬁts. For the sake of clarity, it is useful to convey the basic intuition in the simpler case where
only deterministic contracts can be oﬀered, and then to analyze how the argument is aﬀected
by the introduction of randomization.
3.2. The basic intuition: competition with deterministic contracts
Assume that the equilibrium deterministic contract involves the high eﬀort level eh;a n dl e t
(ˆ ca
s,ˆ cb







= ˆ Hs, incentive compatibility requires that λ ˆ H1+(1− λ) ˆ H2 =0 ;7 hence for each state












plane, be located on the curve κ ˆ Hs.O n











The question, now, is whether this optimal bundle is feasible given the economy’s production in
that state, ¯ Ys. If it is not, then at equilibrium the feasibility constraint is binding, i.e.
Pˆ ca
s +( 1− P)ˆ cb
s = ¯ Ys
In that case, the equilibrium proﬁt is zero, and the optimal consumption is located at an inter-
section of the feasibility constraint above and the curve κ ˆ Hs. This case is illustrated in Figure
3a. In the alternative situation, illustrated in Figure 3b, the expected production (conditional on
the high eﬀort being exerted) exceeds the expected consumption corresponding to the optimal









< ¯ Ys (Zs)
Then from Lemma 3.1 the equilibrium allocation (ˆ ca
s,ˆ cb











,a n d(Zs) implies that the agents receive less than the total amount
produced; the diﬀerence is the principal’s proﬁt in the aggregate state s. This argument suggests
that when aggregate productions, ¯ Y1 and ¯ Y2, are both ’large enough’, then proﬁt should be
positive in at least one state. This intuition turns out to be correct, although its proof is
somewhat tricky because the optimal incentive level ˆ Hs is endogenous and depends in particular
on aggregate productions. Formally, the following result holds:
Proposition 3.3. Under Assumption D, there exists an open set of parameters for which the




2) requires the high eﬀort level and entails positive proﬁts in
both states.
Proof: see Appendix
6See Chassagnon and Chiappori (2002) for a recent discussion.
7As it is well-known, the incentive compatibility constraint must be binding at equilibrium.
10Insert here Figure 3
The economic intuition for this result is a clear consequence of what has been said above.
In the standard case (say, with separable preferences), equilibrium proﬁts are zero because of
undercutting. Should proﬁts be positive, a new entrant could attract all consumers and make
a positive proﬁt. The trick - a direct generalization of undercutting - is to propose a contract
corresponding to an inﬁnitesimal move along the Pareto frontier, in the direction of increased
consumer’s welfare (and decreased proﬁts).
This argument, however, requires the possibility of a trade-oﬀ between welfare and proﬁt. In
our case, such a trade-oﬀ may not exist, since consumer’s welfare cannot be increased beyond










. Then undercutting is just not feasible. In other
words, because of competitive pressure, principals would be willing to give away part of their
proﬁts to the agents, in order to attract a larger number of them. However, this is not possible
here, because the incentive constraint results in an upper bound on the agents’ (contingent)
wealth: making them richer would kill incentives to work, which would in turn result in much
lower welfare for all.
Finally, the positive proﬁt situation has an interesting interpretation in terms of the shape
of the Pareto frontier. Assume for a moment that λ =0(i.e., there is only one aggregate state),







=0 . Also, assume that the consumption bundle
¡
ca∗ (0),c b∗ (0)
¢
is feasible, and




denote the corresponding expected utility.
While the ﬁrm gets a proﬁte q u a lt o
π∗ (0) = ¯ Y − Pca∗ (0) − (1 − P)cb∗ (0) > 0
it is impossible for the agent to reach an expected utility level greater than u∗ (0). Starting from
(u∗ (0),π∗ (0)), it is impossible to change the contract so as to decrease the principal’s proﬁt
and increase the agent’s expected utility: no matter the contract, the agent’s welfare cannot go
beyond u∗ (0). In a standard representation of the Pareto frontier where the horizontal (resp.
vertical) axis represents the agent’s expected utility (resp. the principal’s proﬁt), the frontier
has a vertical segment8. This fact is reminiscent of another, more well-known result already
mentioned by Grossmann and Hart (1983): in a standard principal-agent model with moral
hazard and non separable utility, the agent’s participation constraint may not be binding -
which would correspond to an horizontal segment on the Pareto frontier. Note, however, that
the two results are unrelated. In particular, one can exhibit utility functions that satisfy one
property but not the other.
3.3. Competition with unrestricted contract space
Although the previous argument provides the basic intuition underlying our results, it still relies
on the assumption that only deterministic contracts are implementable. It is however well-
known in contract theory that random contracts may be mutually proﬁtable for principals and
8To be precise, only the upper limit of the segment, A, belongs to the Pareto frontier; all other points are
Pareto-dominated by A. Also, note that reaching the points below A requires free disposal, since it must be
possible to withdraw resources from the principal without increasing the agent’s wealth.
11agents in the presence of moral hazard (see Prescott and Townsend (1984), Gjiesdal (1985), and
Arnott-Stiglitz (1988)). We now characterize competitive equilibria in the space of randomized
contracts.
First, we can use Lemma 3.1 to characterize the equilibrium as an eﬃcient allocation. For-












is an equilibrium, it must




















l,s +( 1− p)Eb
l,s
¢
















This program, however, is not particularly simple or attractive. We shall now discuss its
main properties.
Ex post randomization We indicated above that, in its most general form, the contract Γ
entails both ex ante and ex post randomization. As it turns out, these two types of randomization
play completely diﬀerent roles in our context. Speciﬁcally, ex post randomization plays no speciﬁc
role in our setting, and is actually useless under a mild strengthening of Assumption D, as stated
by the following result:
Proposition 3.4. At any BRS equilibrium, whenever the low eﬀort is exerted the contract





then the equilibrium contract never entails ex post randomization
The ﬁrst part of the Proposition is obvious: whenever the agent has chosen the low eﬀort
level, no incentive problem arises, and increasing the risk born by the (risk averse) agent can
only reduce eﬃciency. The second part is less obvious, and was ﬁrst demonstrated by Arnott
and Stiglitz (1988). The intuition for ex post randomization is that in some cases it can help
relaxing the incentive constraints. Assume, for instance, that u(c,e) is such that the agent is
risk neutral when e = eh, whereas he is risk averse for e = el. Then ex post randomization can
be used as an eﬀective incentive device : it increases the relative cost of the low eﬀort without
changing either expected proﬁts or the agent’s expected utility conditional on eh.I nf a c t ,i nt h i s
extreme case, (suﬃcient) ex post randomization can implement the ﬁrst best. This, however,
requires particular properties of the third cross derivative of the utility function (i.e., the way
∂2u/∂c2 changes with eﬀort) that are ruled out by assumption (DC). Technically, (DC) implies
in particular that risk aversion increases with eﬀort (decreases with leisure)9,w h i c hr u l e so u t
9This eﬀect is somewhat natural. It has been argued, for instance, that more leisure provides more ﬂexibility
to cope with adverse income shocks (say, by increasing labor supply). See for instance Gollier (1999)
12the ’incentive’ role of ex post randomization.
Also, it should be noted that (DC) is fully consistent with Assumption D. Indeed, the latter
states that the increase in marginal utility of income due to an increase in leisure is negligible
when consumption is small, and dominant when it is large, while DC requires that it increases
monotonically in-between.
Ex ante randomization On the contrary, ex ante randomization turns out to play a key
role in our context. To see why, start from the situation described above, where the equilibrium
with deterministic contracts entails some positive proﬁt πs in both states s =1 ,2.N o w , a
principal can successfully propose the following, ex ante randomized contract: with probability
α (where α is smaller than but very close to 1), the agent receives the deterministic equilibrium
contract; with probability 1 − α, he receives an alternative contract, entailing low eﬀort and
some consumption level Cs independent of the individual shock (but contingent on the aggregate
state), with






This contract is feasible, and entails a proﬁte q u a lt o².F o r1 − α and ² small enough,
Cs is arbitrarily large, and u(Cs,e l) is larger than the utility generated at the deterministic
equilibrium. It follows that the new contract is strictly preferred to the deterministic one, hence
will attract all agents, while still generating positive proﬁt - a contradiction with the deﬁnition
of an equilibrium. This shows that whenever the deterministic contract entails positive proﬁt
in both aggregate states, the equilibrium contract cannot be deterministic, but must entail
randomization.
In the randomized contract just described, each agent can either be ’lucky’, in the sense that
he receives a no eﬀort, high consumption contract; or he can get the standard, deterministic
contract, in which case he faces the same incentives to work as before. The intuition is simple.
Because of competitive pressures, proﬁts should be dissipated in wage increases. This, however,
c a n n o tb ed o n ei nad e t e r m i n i s t i cw a y ,b e c a u s ei tw ould destroy incentives to work (that’s the
previous result). Ex ante randomization solves the problem by exploiting the separability of
expected utility across states; the idea being to distribute the proﬁt in a contingent way, i.e., in
some states of the world (as deﬁned by the ex ante random device). Technically, randomization
creates a (low probability) contingency where agents are prescribed to exert low eﬀort, so that
the incentive constraint is not binding and proﬁts can be freely distributed. From the agent’s
ex ante viewpoint, this randomized contract is better, because of the positive (even if small)
probability of being lucky.
It must be stressed that, at equilibrium, some agents will work (e = eh) whereas other will
not (e = el). This has some cost in term of total production, since the latter will be equal to
(1 − α)¯ ys + α¯ Ys, which is strictly less than ¯ Ys. However, the loss may be very small (since
α can be arbitrarily close to one). On a more theoretical side, it is important to note that
the coexistence of diﬀerent equilibrium eﬀort levels does not require the corresponding utilities
to be equal. On the contrary, ex ante randomization is useful precisely because it allows the
coexistence of diﬀerent and non equivalent (in terms of the agent’s utility) eﬀort levels. This
intuition reveals crucial in more general contexts, and especially when diﬀerent commodities are
produced (see Bennardo 1997).
13The main result Finally, the intuition given above for the role of randomization assumes
that (deterministic) equilibrium proﬁt is positive in both states. We now concentrate on the
more interesting case where, in the absence of randomization, the equilibrium eﬀort is eh and
the optimal contract entails positive proﬁt in the good state (state 1) but zero proﬁts in the
alternative state 2. This will typically be the case when ¯ Y1 is large while ¯ Y2 is small (see
Appendix D for a formal proof). We also assume that ¯ y2 is much smaller than ¯ y1 - i.e., although
prevention is always good, it becomes absolutely crucial in case of a hurricane.
In such a context, ex ante randomization can still be used to redistribute the proﬁtt h a ti s
generated in the good state of the world, but this can no longer be done at no cost. The crucial
point is that, given the prevention technology, eﬀort must be chosen (possibly in a random way)
before the aggregate state of the world is known. If a fraction 1 − α of the agents receive the
low eﬀort contract, then with probability (1 − λ) the average production of these agents will be
at the very low level ¯ y2. Clearly, this risk is non insurable, since it directly reﬂects aggregate
uncertainty (technically, the resource constraint must be satisﬁed in each aggregate state). As
a result, redistribution of proﬁt in state 1 is realized at a cost - namely, less total resources
are available in the bad state 2, where they are most needed. The question, now, is whether
the beneﬁt or randomization - the ability to redistribute proﬁt in the good state - is worth the
cost - namely, reducing everybody’s consumption in the bad state, although all agents would be
willing to transfer resources to that state.
The answer ultimately depends on the properties of the utility function, as stated the next
proposition.
Proposition 3.5. Assume that Assumptions D and DC are satisﬁed. If utility with the low
eﬀort is unbounded above :
lim
x→+∞u(x,el)=+ ∞
then the BRS equilibrium contract always entails ex ante randomization and zero proﬁt. Con-
versely, if utility is bounded above :
lim
x→+∞u(x,el) < +∞
then there exist an open range of parameters for which any BRS equilibrium contract is deter-
ministic and equilibrium proﬁts are positive in state 1.
Proof: see Appendix
The intuition is that a very small 1−α leads to practically inﬁnite consumption in the most
lucky case (low eﬀort contract and good state of the world), and this perspective, however un-
likely, is suﬃcient to decide in favor of randomization whenever utility is unbounded.C o n v e r s e l y ,
if utility is bounded, randomization may, depending on the parameters, become too costly. Then
the equilibrium contract is the deterministic one, and entails positive proﬁt. Note that in our
context, a bounded utility has the following interpretation : there exists some consumption level
¯ C, some (very small) probability 1 − ¯ α and some (very low) consumption level ¯ A such that a
lottery paying ¯ A with probability ¯ α and some arbitrarily large amount B with probability 1− ¯ α
14will never be preferred to ¯ C, whatever B. Or, to put it diﬀerently: paying an inﬁnite amount
with a low probability is not suﬃcient to compensate for a large (but ﬁnite) and very likely loss.
From now on, our analysis will mainly focus on the situation just described where the equi-
librium contract is deterministic and generates positive proﬁt in the aggregate state 1 and zero




2) denote the corresponding equilibrium
contract.
4. A general equilibrium viewpoint
4.1. The framework
In the previous sections, we adopted a strategic point of view, where a ﬁnite number of princi-
pals simultaneously propose contracts. This setting explicitly takes into account the strategic
nature of competition, and relies upon an equilibrium concept borrowed from game theory (non
cooperative Nash in our case). We now consider an alternative, ’general equilibrium’ perspective
where agents are price takers in a general commodity space. The approach is borrowed from the
seminal work of Prescott and Townsend (1984a, b). We assume that the economy consists of two
types of agents, households and intermediaries - the latter corresponding to the principals in the
BRS context.10 We use the ’Walrasian’ concept of equilibrium under asymmetric information
deﬁned by Prescott and Townsend. In particular, we use the modeling technology provided in
their papers. No restriction is placed on the space of enforceable contracts; i.e., we consider the
pure moral hazard case deﬁned above, where the set of available (random) contracts allows to
exploit all potential gains from trade.
In this setting, a contract is a distribution on the space of allowable consumptions, produc-
tions and eﬀort. Following Prescott Townsend, we make the simplifying assumption that the set
of possible consumption levels and, consequently, the set of allowable contractual contingent






where c varies within the ﬁnite set of feasible consumption levels, and i ∈ {l,h} indexes the
eﬀort level. Speciﬁc constraints have to be satisﬁed, that reﬂect the nature of the available
technology (e.g., the marginal probability of producing yx in the aggregate state s conditional
on supplying eﬀort ei is given by nature) and the probability nature of the commodity (e.g.,
the sum of conditional probabilities must equal one)11. Also, the following notation will reveal
convenient:







10An alternative and equivalent interpretation assumes away intermediaries. The agents in the economy can
create insurance ﬁrms in the usual way, i.e. by allocating property rights (shares) among them, and proﬁts (if
any) are distributed among shareholders.
11These constraints are exactly analogous to those in Prescott-Townsend; for brevity, we do not restate them
here.
15denotes the restriction of x to the aggregate state s (i.e., the distribution of consumption,
production and eﬀort when state s is realized).
Each commodity (contract) x has a price. Prices of commodities are linear with respect to
the probabilities P(c,yx
s,e i); i.e., if πc,yx
1,ei is the price of a contract paying c contingent on ei
a n do nt h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h ee n d o w m e n tyx
s, and zero otherwise, the value of the commodity x








Again, it is convenient to use the notation
Π =( Π1,Π2)
so that
Π.x = Π1.x1 + Π2.x2
Contracts are oﬀered by risk-neutral intermediaries that are price takers and supply contracts
in a proﬁt-maximizing way, subject to feasibility constraints of the form12
rs.x ≤ 0
where





In words, this constraint requires that, in each aggregate state of the world, intermediaries
cannot deliver more of the consumption good than what is actually produced.
Finally, households buy contracts at market price so as to maximize utility under budget
constraint, and under the additional constraint that any purchased contract must belong to the
consumption set. A speciﬁc feature of Prescott and Townsend’s approach is the treatment of
the incentive compatibility constraint. Prescott and Townsend suggest to include the constraint
within the deﬁnition of the agent’s consumption set (in other words, the agent cannot ’consume’
a contract that is not incentive compatible).
A ﬁrst consequence of this setting is the following:
Lemma 4.1. At any equilibrium, proﬁts must be zero. In particular, at any equilibrium with
positive trade, the price vector Πs must be either identically null or proportional to rs.
12If intermediaries are allowed to trade among them commodities accross states of the world using Arrow-
Debreu securities (say, selling one unit of the commodity in state 1 in exchange for k units of the commodity in
state 2), then only one constraint is needed. However, since such trades cannot take place at equilibrium, the
equilibrium will actually satisfy the two constraints rsxs =0 . Our results hold under both interpretations.
16Proof. Assume that, at equilibrium, a contract generates positive proﬁts. With a linear
technology, its supply would then be inﬁnite, and market clearing cannot obtain, a contradiction.
A s s u m e ,n o w ,t h a tΠs is not identically null, and consider the two half spaces EΠs =
{x/Πsx>0} and Ers = {x/r sx ≤ 0} .I f Πs is not proportional to rs, then the two spaces
have a non empty intersection, which is a convex cone. If this cone has an empty intersection
with the positive orthant, no feasible contract generates a non-negative proﬁt; then no trade
takes place at equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the intersection of the cone with the positive
orthant is not empty, there exists a contract that is feasible and generates a strictly positive
proﬁt, a contradiction.
The intuition is that if proﬁts are positive, then any producer is willing to supply an inﬁnite
amount of the corresponding contracts. Since demand is necessarily ﬁnite, there must be excess
supply and markets do not clear. It follows that the Prescott-Townsend approach explicitly
requires either zero proﬁt or zero prices as an equilibrium condition.
4.2. Existence of an equilibrium
We now concentrate on the existence of an equilibrium. A ﬁrst remark is that, in our setting,
a zero-price equilibrium cannot exist. Indeed, prices are used to decentralize the feasibility
constraints at the agents’ level. If they are zero, there is a positive demand for contracts that
are not feasible and an equilibrium cannot exist. Formally:
Lemma 4.2. At any equilibrium, neither Π1 nor Π2 can equal the null vector.
Proof. Assume that Πs is identically null. Consider a contract x =( x1,x 2) such that xs
requires the low eﬀort level and provides some very high level of consumption C with probability
one, whatever the idiosyncratic outcome. This contract is incentive-compatible, hence belongs
to the agents’s consumption set. Also, buying this contract cannot be incompatible with the
budget constraint, since its price is zero whatever C.F o r C large enough, it is preferred to
any incentive-compatible contract inducing high eﬀort (remember the utility provided by such
contracts is bounded). At zero prices, there will be a positive demand for some contracts of this
kind. However, they cannot be supplied, since they violate the feasibility constraint.
We can now show our main result.
Proposition 4.3. Consider the set E of economies in which all Nash equilibrium contract entail
positive proﬁt in the aggregate state 1 and zero proﬁt in the aggregate state 2. No Walrasian
equilibrium exists in any economy belonging to the set E.
Proof. From Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, at any equilibrium with non zero trade, the price vector must
be proportional to (r1,r 2). Equilibrium prices are thus deﬁned up to a multiplicative constant.
After normalization, the price of any contract (including ˆ γ) must be such that the producer
makes zero proﬁt. It follows that, whenever the conditions for Proposition 4.3 are satisﬁed, the
17price of ˆ γ must be negative (i.e., the agent receives money when purchasing the contract) and
equal to minus the proﬁtm a d eo nˆ γ.
Consider, now, the agent’s perspective. If he chooses ˆ γ, his budget constraint is not bind-
ing. So he can aﬀord a contract that is slightly more expensive. For instance, he can buy













(i.e., such that ca
2 > ˆ ca
2,c b
2 > ˆ cb
2 - remember such a contract exists by
construction). Since Π2 is proportional to r2,t h ed i ﬀerence in price between the two contracts
is proportional to ca
2 − ˆ ca
2 + cb
2 − ˆ cb
2, hence can be made smaller than the proﬁtm a d eo nˆ γ.This




2) belongs to the agent’s budget and consump-
tion sets, and is strictly preferred to ˆ γ. At any equilibrium, the demand of a contract of this
sort will be positive, whereas its supply must be zero since it violates the feasibility constraint
in state 2 - a contradiction.
Two comments are in order at this point. Firstly, the previous Proposition provides an
example of an economy where no Walrasian equilibrium a la Prescott-Townsend exists. This
conclusion may seem surprising, because of the close relationship between the Prescott-Townsend
approach and standard general equilibrium (GE) theory. A Prescott-Townsend economy is
but a particular case of a production economy with constant return to scale technologies; the
existence of an equilibrium obtains as a consequence of the standard existence theorem in GE.
However, the analogy between moral hazard economies and standard GE models requires a
reinterpretation of such basic concepts as prices or commodities. Through the reinterpretation
process, some assumptions that seem totally natural in the standard framework may become
much more restrictive, and may actually fail to be satisﬁed in many contexts. For instance,
monotonicity of preferences, a natural hypothesis in standard consumer theory, does not obtain
in the new setting. As it is well known, the existence theorem in GE (see Debreu 1959 or
Arrow and Hahn 1971) holds without monotonicity of preferences, but it then requires local non
satiation and resource-relatedness. With deterministic contracts only, local non satiation is not
satisﬁed in our context (utility is locally satiated at ˆ γ). When lottery contracts are enforceable,
local non satiation is satisﬁed, but resource relatedness is not.
Secondly, the result has an important implication for the links between Walrasian and
Bertrand equilibria13. It can be easily showed that the two sets coincide whenever, at each
BRS equilibrium, ﬁrms make zero proﬁts. For this class of economies, the Walrasian equilib-
rium concept can be interpreted as a reduced equilibrium form of a Bertrand-Nash game. In
the alternative case where BRS equilibria entail positive proﬁts, a completely diﬀerent result
obtains. BRS and Walrasian equilibria do not coincide; Walrasian equilibria do not exist in
that case, whereas BRS equilibria always exist and are constrained eﬃcient. The key intuition
is that positive proﬁts contradicts market clearing. Assume that the BRS equilibrium contract
entails positive proﬁt (which implies in particular that the supply of these contracts is rationed
at equilibrium). By deﬁnition, this contract is preferred by agents to any alternative, feasible
one - including those entailing zero proﬁt. As argued above, market clearing requires that only
contracts yielding zero proﬁt can be exchanged. But any principal could then proﬁtably deviate
by proposing a positive proﬁt contract that is preferred by agents as well. In other words, the
Walrasian equilibrium concept does not satisfy the basic condition of absence of proﬁtable devi-
13See Bennardo (1997) for a detailed analysis of the links between Walrasian and Bertrand equilibria within a
general, multi-commodity setting.
18ation deﬁning non cooperative Nash equilibria. What market clearing conditions do is imposing
ad hoc constraints on the set of mutually convenient trades that agents can undertake (in our
case, an unfortunate consequence is that no equilibrium satisfying these constraints exist). In
this sense, the Walrasian-like equilibrium notion can be considered as a quite unsatisfactory
equilibrium concept.
Finally, a diﬀerent modeling choice can be made; namely, the incentive constraint can be
imposed on the set of contracts oﬀered by intermediaries instead of being introduced through the
deﬁnition of the consumption set. Then Walrasian equilibria always exists, even when Bertrand
equilibrium contracts generate positive proﬁt; however, Walrasian equilibria are typically con-
strained ineﬃcient (because they entail low eﬀort). In this case, imposing market clearing
typically results in welfare losses.
5. Related literature
Our ﬁndings are related to three branches of the literature on asymmetric information: general
equilibrium approach, strategic competition with decentralized trading and mechanism design.
Helpman and Laﬀont (1975), Prescott and Townsend (1984), Gale (1996) and Bisin and
Gottardi (1998) are among the main contributors to the literature on general equilibrium with
asymmetric information. The relationships between our model and Prescott-Townsend have
been discussed in the previous section. In another seminal contribution, Helpman and Laﬀont
(1975) characterize Walrasian equilibria with moral hazard and anonymous trades and show
that Walrasian equilibria may not exist because of the discontinuity of the assets’ demand cor-
respondence generated by moral hazard under linear prices; when they exist, they are generically
constrained ineﬃcient. Bisin and Gottardi (1997) generalize these results to a larger class of
economies and also demonstrate that existence can be restored by imposing (exogenous) bounds
on agents’ trades. Such bounds on trades are suggestive of rationing phenomena. In a Wal-
rasian setting, however, trades’ restrictions ensuring existence have to be exogenously imposed
(whether they can endogenously emerge from market interactions remain unclear), furthermore,
we rule out these problems by assuming non-anonymous, exclusive trades. Finally, Gale (1996)
studies competition with adverse selection in a non strategic-setting where markets are assumed
to clear through rationing. Although our approach and that of Gale are to some extent comple-
mentary, the hypotheses on the trading mechanisms are diﬀerent. In the equilibrium notion used
by Gale, rationing is the only market clearing mechanism available (markets clear by rationing
instead of prices), while in our context rationing emerge only if it allows to exploit gains from
t r a d et h a tc a n n o tb ea c h i e v e da tm a r k e tc l e a r i n gp r i c e s .
Regarding the game-theoretic literatures on decentralized trading and mechanism design,
our ﬁndings are related to three types of results in these literature. One is the existence of Nash
equilibria with positive proﬁt in insurance economies with anonymous trades which has been
studied in several papers by Arnott and Stiglitz (1987, 1988, 1993), and recently by Bisin and
Guaitoli (1999). A second related result is the existence of equilibria with rationing, which is
a standard result of the eﬃciency wage/credit rationing literature. Finally, the optimality of
budget breaking mechanisms for environments with asymmetric information and externalities
has been studied in the mechanism design literature and in the literature on moral hazard in
teams. The ﬁrst two classes of models (moral hazard with anonymous trades and eﬃciency
wage) depart explicitly from the pure moral hazard case we consider in the present paper, in
19the sense that they restrict their attention to a particular subset of the contract space (i.e., they
assume away either exclusive or randomized contracts - or both), while the literature on budget
breaking with moral hazard focus on situation where budget breaking only occurs out of the
equilibrium path.
Speciﬁcally, in the single-good insurance setting with anonymous trades studied by Arnott-
Stiglitz and Bisin-Guaitoli, positive proﬁts are a consequence of a discontinuity in the demand for
insurance. Such a discontinuity is in turn caused by the externality that appears in the absence
of exclusive relationship - a point ﬁrst emphasized by Helpman and Laﬀont (1974) (see also
Hellwig (1983) and Segal (1999) on this point). The idea, here, is that when agents can freely
buy insurance from diﬀerent insurers, the proﬁtability of the contract oﬀered by each insurer
depends (through incentives) on the total amount of insurance that the agent receives. In our
setting, positive proﬁts equilibria exist even though exclusive contracts rule out this externality.
In addition, the positive proﬁt result in Arnott-Stiglitz does not extend to economies where
agents can trade randomized contracts.
The eﬃciency wages literature (see Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) and Malcomson-MacLeod (1989)
among others) is based on another type of externality - namely, the proﬁtability of a labor
contract depends on the unemployment rate of the economy (i.e. on the hiring decisions of
all the other ﬁrms in the economy). The initial Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) model also imposes
exogenous bounds upon the ’punishment’ that can be inﬂicted to an agent (typically, he can
only be laid oﬀ at worse). Even under these restrictions, however, the rationing result is not
robust to the introduction of non linear pricing devices such as bonding, as showed by Carmichael
(1985). Malcomson and Mac-Leod, on the other hand, assume ’double moral hazard’, in the
sense that neither the agent’s eﬀort, nor the principal’s measurement of output are veriﬁable.
Under this assumption, the emergence of eﬃciency wages does not require limited liability; it
stems from the restrictions on the set of enforceable contracts due to the principals’ incentive
constraints. However, rationing, again, is not robust to the introduction of random contracts,
and speciﬁcally of tournaments, as argued by Malcomson (1984). Similar considerations also
apply to the credit market model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Finally, an interesting diﬀerence
with our results is that in both eﬃciency wage and credit rationing models, the informed party
(the agent) is rationed, while in our setting it is the non informed party (the principal) who is
rationed and gets a rent in equilibrium.
Equilibrium positive proﬁts are ﬁnally reminiscent of a general result in the mechanism
design literature, namely that budget breaking mechanisms are generally welfare enhancing in
the presence of externalities among privately informed agents. The fundamental contribution
of Holmstrom (1982) showed that budget breaking mechanism generally improve incentives in
team production with moral hazard. In this context, the non measurability of the individual
contributions to the collective output (the non-separability of the production function) implies
that feasible payoﬀs to one agents depend on the eﬀort exerted by all others. In the Holmstrom
model, however, the ﬁrst best (or second best) allocation is achievable through a mechanism
inducing principals’ proﬁt or losses out of equilibrium (i.e. if agents choose out of equilibrium
actions-eﬀorts) but such that principals get zero proﬁt given the equilibrium actions. Under
this mechanism, agents consume exactly what they produce. In our setting, in contrast, the
technology is fully separable, and principals make positive proﬁt in equilibrium.
206. Conclusion
Our paper studies an economy in which identical agents interact with linear principals in a
moral hazard context with observable trades. This economy is successively considered from two
viewpoints. We ﬁrst adopt a ’strategic’ perspective. The main result, here, is the existence of
BRS equilibria in which the producers, albeit using a constant return to scale technology, make
positive proﬁts and have a rationed eﬀective supply at equilibrium. When only deterministic
contracts are enforceable, this conclusion obtains in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, under
simple and fairly general assumptions on preferences and technologies; namely, the marginal
utility of consumption must increase with leisure, especially when income is high. To the best
of our knowledge, this result is new, and may shed a new light on the properties of strategic
competition under moral hazard in situations where exogenous limitations prevent the use of
randomized contracts.
A second result is that when randomized contracts are allowed for, positive proﬁt equilibria
may still appear, although not in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. Hence the general
intuition that competition drives proﬁts to zero may fail to hold in an asymmetric information
context, even with totally unrestricted contract spaces.
These results have a counterpart in the alternative, general equilibrium perspective. When-
ever BRS equilibria entail positive proﬁts, the standard Walrasian concept, which imposes mar-
ket clearing, cannot be interpreted as a reduced form equilibrium of a game in which agents
set prices in order to exploit potential gains from trade. That is, a producer and a worker can
proﬁtably deviate from the Walrasian equilibrium by exchanging out-of-equilibrium contracts
at relative prices that are not compatible with Walrasian market clearing.
One important related point is that, once rationing emerges, contracts must be allocated
among the agents in the rationed side of the market (the supply side in our model) in a way that
is not entirely determined by market prices. The precise form of the equilibrium will typically
depend on the particular rationing scheme adopted - a choice that necessarily involves some
degree of arbitrariness. However, while diﬀerent rationing schemes may decentralize diﬀerent
allocations, the mere existence of rationing is purely endogenous. In situations similar to the
one we just described, rationing is a necessary consequence of the assumed absence of proﬁtable
deviations that deﬁnes Nash equilibria. In that sense, it emerges as a by-product of individual
rationality - and speciﬁcally of the agents’ ability to implement any type of trades that turn
out to be mutually beneﬁcial. This feature is to be contrasted, in particular, with the so-called
’disequilibrium’ approach initiated by Benassy (1975), Dreze (1982) and others, where rationing
was a consequence of exogenously imposed restrictions on price movements (typically, prices were
assumed rigid (at least in the short run), albeit prices changes would have improved welfare).
Two questions remain open at this stage. One concerns the robustness of our results. Al-
though our setting is highly speciﬁc (two outcomes, two eﬀort levels, identical agents) our results
can be extended to more general environments (see Bennardo-Chiappori 1999). Similarly, the
exclusivity assumption can be viewed as imposing an extreme form on non-linear pricing; how-
ever, it can be replaced with the milder hypothesis that contractual terms of trades are veriﬁable
at suﬃciently low costs and non linear (but not necessarily exclusive) contracts are enforceable.
Finally, we do believe that our conclusions are by no means pathological, and that on the con-
trary they are likely to hold in many (suﬃciently complex) second best contexts. A general
property is that competition among principals results in equilibrium allocations which maxi-
21mize agent’s welfare subject to several constraints, including non negative proﬁts and incentive
compatibility conditions. However, there is simply no general argument suggesting that the non
negative proﬁt constraint should be binding in all cases.
The second fundamental issue concern the modeling of strategic interactions between diﬀerent
types of agents ( possibly including large intermediaries) in a fully developed general equilibrium
model where agents interact in several markets and several commodities are possibly produced
and exchanged. A natural question, in this context, is whether a reduced form equilibrium
concept can be deﬁned and used. By reduced form, we mean a model that, while abstracting
from the detailed game theoretic speciﬁcation of the trading mechanisms, can select a set of
allocations that coincides with the Nash equilibrium outcomes of a class of games in which
maximizing agents and ﬁrms exploit arbitrage possibilities by choosing their trading plans.
These questions are addressed in Bennardo (1997, 2001) where the Bayesian perfect equilibria
of a multicommodity general equilibrium economy with moral hazard are characterized, and a
(reduced form) equilibrium concept is also proposed, that replaces Walrasian market clearing
with the Nash-type requirement of absence of proﬁtable deviations.
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A. Proof of lemma 2.1
Note ﬁrst that, from Assumption D,
∂F
∂cb =( 1− P)
∂u(cb,e h)
∂c






From the implicit function theorem, (A.2) deﬁnes (when it admits solutions) cb as a contin-
uously diﬀerentiable function of ca and H.Aﬁrst consequence of (A.1) is that, for any given
ca, cb is a decreasing function of H. Consider, now, cb as a function of ca for some given H;t h i s
























In this fraction, the denominator is strictly positive. Consider, now, the numerator, say N.


































From Assumption D, this implies that N is negative for ca large enough; then κH is decreas-
ing.
Thus κH is increasing for ca small enough, decreasing for ca large enough, and continuously
diﬀerentiable in between. Hence it has one (global) maximum value (and possibly several local
maxima); ¯ ca (H) corresponds to the greatest local maximum.







This equation does not depend on H. Hence the values of ca at which the maxima are
reached are the same for all curves κH. Note that if the ratio
∂u(c,eh)/∂c
∂u(c,el)/∂c is monotonic, there
exists one local (and global) maximum only.
23B. Proof of proposition 2.2
We ﬁrst establish the following Lemma:
Lemma B.1. For any given ¯ H, there exist a value va ¡ ¯ H
¢
such that for any H ≥ ¯ H,a ta n y
point (ca,c b) on the incentive frontier κH with ca >v a ¡ ¯ H
¢
, the slope of the agent’s indiﬀerence
curve through (ca,c b),a s s u m i n ge ﬀort eh, is negative and smaller (in absolute value) than that
of κH.
P r o o fo ft h eL e m m a

















































For ca large enough, the left hand side term goes to zero, while the right hand side term is
bounded away from zero. Indeed, from Lemma 2.1, κ ¯ H is bounded above in the (ca,c b) plane,
and this upper bound is also an upper bound for all κH with H ≥ ¯ H. Hence the conclusion.
Lemma B.1 essentially states that, from any point on κH where ca is large enough (so that
κH is decreasing in the
¡
ca,c b¢
plane), an agent who is constrained to move along κH always
prefers the direction in which ca is reduced (and cb is increased).
We can now conclude the proof of the Proposition. If KH is bounded, the result is obvious.




belongs to κH. A consequence




to any (ca,c b) on κH such that ca >
va (H). Then the contract that maximizes expected utility on K must belong to the set




This set is compact, hence the result. A characterization of c∗ (H) is that the slope of the



























24C .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 3
Pick up two values H1 and H2 such that λH1 +( 1− λ)H2 =0 .D e ﬁne va (Hs) as in Lemma




Pca +( 1− P)cb
Let (ˆ ca
s,ˆ cb
s) denote the equilibrium consumptions in state s corresponding to (Y1,Y 2), and deﬁne






= ¯ Hs,s=1 ,2.S i n c eλH1 +( 1− λ)H2 = λ ¯ H1 +( 1− λ) ¯ H2 =0 ,w eh a v et h a t
Hs ≤ ¯ Hs for at least one s.T h e nκ ¯ Hs is below κHs, and since from Lemma B.1 ˆ ca
s <v a (Hs),
it must be the case that
Pˆ ca
s +( 1− P)ˆ cb
s < ¯ Ys
D .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . 5
Take some given, ’large’ Y1.W eﬁrst show that for Y2 and (P − p) small enough, the deterministic
equilibrium is such that proﬁti sz e r oi nt h eb a ds t a t e2 .A s s u m en o t ,a n dd e ﬁne ˆ Hs as above.
We show that by reducing ˆ H2 by dH, hence relaxing the incentive constraint in state 2, while
increasing ˆ H1 by 1−λ
λ .dH, one can increase welfare, which contradicts the eﬃciency of the
equilibrium. The change dH generates a gain dW2 in state 2 and a loss −dW1 in state 1. Deﬁne
W (H)= m a x
F(ca,cb)=H








∂c − (1 − p)
∂u(cb,el)
∂c
If Y2 is small, so is cb












If Y1 is large, on the other hand, cb














(1 − p) − (1 − P)λ
.dH
25When P − p is small enough, dW2 > −dW1,Q E D .
Starting from the deterministic equilibrium, we now consider ﬁrst the consequences of the
introduction of some inﬁnitesimal ex ante randomization, as described in subsection 3.2. Switch-
ing from the deterministic equilibrium to a randomized contract of this kind has a beneﬁt dB1
in state 1 and a cost −dB2 in state 2; for 1 − α small enough, both the beneﬁta n dt h ec o s t
are inﬁnitesimal, and proportional to 1 − α at the ﬁrst order. We now compare the ﬁrst order
beneﬁt and cost. In state 1, the beneﬁt comes from the fact that, with probability 1 − α,t h e






dB1 =( 1− α).∆u
where
∆u = u(C,el) −
¡
Pu(ˆ ca
1,e h)+( 1− P)u(ˆ cb
1,e h)
¢
In state 2, the total amount of resources available is decreased by (1 − α)
¡¯ Y2 − ¯ y2
¢
; −dB2
can be approximated by a product of the form (1 − α)
¡¯ Y2 − ¯ y2
¢
K,w h e r eK is related to the
expected marginal utility of income in that state (technically, K is larger than the lower bound
of marginal utility of income in some neighborhood of the contract in state 2). Note that if ¯ Y2
is small enough, K is arbitrarily large.
When α goes to 1, the consumption level C goes to inﬁnity. If u is unbounded, ∆u goes
to inﬁnity, and so does dB1,w h e r e a sdB2 remains bounded; the ﬁrst order eﬀect of the ran-




1,e h)+( 1− P)u(ˆ cb
1,e h)
¢
.F o r¯ Y2 small enough, the marginal utility of income term
K is arbitrarily large, and the ﬁrst order eﬀect of the randomization is negative.
Finally, consider the case of a non inﬁnitesimal ex ante randomization. By the same argument
used above, the gain it generates is bounded above since ∆u is bounded. On the other hand the
cost of a non-inﬁnitesimal randomization must be strictly larger than that of an inﬁnitesimal
one, as it is immediate to verify, and becomes arbitrarily large for ¯ Y2 small enough. Hence we
can conclude that no ex ante randomization can be proﬁtable.
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